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ABSTRACT 
There are three types of ambiguity which have prompted me to write this paper; scope 
ambiguity, metarepresentational ambiguity, and presupposition preservation or cancellation. 
To better understand these ambiguities, I try to provide examples for each of them, along with 
my initial intuitions on how one can approach to avoiding them. However, to better 
understand why these ambiguities arise, one must delve deeper into the basic tenants of 
negation; its semantics and pragmatics. In this paper, I try to outline four approaches to the 
semantics and pragmatics of negation, based on Robyn Carston’s Thoughts and Utterances. 
These approaches can be categorized as those of semantic ambiguity with pragmatic 
disambiguation, and those of semantic univocality with pragmatics still playing a major role 
in the understanding of negation. The scope distinction is highly relevant for the 
understanding of these approaches, as the ones of semantic univocality diverge precisely in 
this aspect; some of them take the narrow scope of negation to be pragmatically derived from 
the wide scope, while others propose that neither is derived from the other, but rather from a 
different starting point altogether. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I will try to show the impact pragmatics have on the understanding of 
negation and what their role is as opposed to semantics. The majority of this paper will be 
based on Robyn Carston’s Thoughts and Utterances in which she provides an overview of 
prominent linguistic and philosophical theories concerning negation and its understanding. 
Carston classifies the different views on negation based on their understanding of the 
semantics of 'not' (the natural language operator, as opposed to the logical operator), and the 
role of pragmatics in the disambiguation of this understanding.  
After giving a short historical overview on the debate on negation and why it is 
important, I will attempt to outline three of the basic problems which have prompted many 
philosophers to deliberate about negation; the scope ambiguity, the metarperesentational 
distinction, and the presupposition preserving or cancellation. After that, I will try to provide 
some of the solutions which seem intuitive when considering these problems, but also show 
that one has to dig deeper into the understanding of the semantics and pragmatics of negation 
to better understand the basis of these problems and to better understand negation overall. 
Following this, I will try to outline the basic understandings of ‘not’ given by different 
philosophers and explain the differences between them. They based these understandings on 
one or more of the problems I mentioned, so I will also try to see how their approaches reflect 
on these problems. Finally, I will try to give my own suggestion which I hope to prove better 
reflects how negation is understood in natural language and what this means for the 
approaches mentioned beforehand. 
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2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
 In this section, I am going to give a rather brief historical account of how the debate 
about negation developed from ancient times to the broad debate we have today. I will try to 
concentrate more on the problematic aspect of the debate instead of the historical one, but 
hopefully, this will show how the topic of this paper fits into the ongoing struggle to explain 
negation. 
 The first relatively comprehensive account on negation and how it behaves was given 
by Aristotle in his Categories (11b17) in which he divided what he called the genus of 
opposition into four categories: contrariety, contradiction, correlation, and privation.1 He later 
developed these categories in more details which led to the conception of the logical square. 
These categories are still being thought in schools and logic courses to this day. These 
categories gave wake to many philosophers to theorize about negation, its rules and problems. 
Thus, the contemporary debate concerns much more specific parts of negation.  
For the purposes of this paper, I will follow the example set by J.L. Speranza and 
Laurence R. Horn in their article titled A brief history of negation, and focus on Grice as a 
guideline to showcase the bigger ongoing debate. 
In their article, Speranza and Horn explain that when thinking about negation, they 
share a starting point with Paul Grice, whom they take to be a catalyst in the debate between 
Modernism and Neo-Traditionalism in terms of negation; they claim that there often seem to 
be divergences between the formal devices and their counterparts in natural language (‘not’, 
‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if’, ‘all’, ‘some’ (or ‘at least one’), ‘the’).2 
 From this, it follows that one has to consider how the logical operator for negation 
reflects the use of the word ‘not’ in natural language. In order to formalize certain sentences, 
we have to consider the rules of logical connectives and how they interact with each other. It 
seems fairly intuitive that to provide an opposite truth value to a certain proposition, we have 
to employ the negation operator. However, as I will try to show in this paper, in some cases it 
is not clear what negation operates over. One could argue that this is due to a divergence 
between the logical operator for negation and the natural language negation on the other hand. 
                                                            
1 Speranza and Horn 2010: 279 
2 Speranza and Horn 2010: 278 
5 
 
It should also be noted that ‘formal’  can be understood in different ways when talking 
about negation. The narrow view of a ‘formal’ operator concerns only those cases in which 
the logical operator mirrors what can be formalized in the natural language in those instances 
where the word ‘not’ is present. Here, negation is viewed strictly as a logical form. The broad 
view, on the other hand, represents those cases where the word ‘not’ is understood as a result 
of formalization. In such cases, we can say that the word ‘not’ in the natural language is in 
some way formal.3 This distinction can be better understood as what is formalized as opposed 
to what can be formalized. 
 Most of the modern debate on about negation is centered on the differences between 
the Modernist approach and the Neo-Traditionalist approach to language. Modernists are 
usually concerned with providing a set of rules for valid inferences and how formal devices 
behave in those inferences.4 
 In the modernist syntax for negation, Grice tries to compare the formation rules to 
chemical reactions where a negated formula is seen as a radical, created by adding the 
negation operator to the formula which itself was a radical beforehand. He compares this to 
atoms regarded as primary constituents for a certain compound, as they remain unchanged by 
any chemical reaction which may occur.5 Negation behaves similarly in this matter to the 
chemical reactions in this analogy. The constituents retain their properties when the operator 
for negation is added, but the overall picture is changed. 
 On the other hand, the Neo-Traditionalists usually propose that there should be some 
contrast between what is affirmed and what is negated. Strawson claims that the role of the 
negation operator is one of exclusion and contradiction. He believes that negation should be 
used to correct assertions which do not mirror reality, be it ones of existence, suggestion, 
hopes, expectations, etc.6 He goes on to explain that since the role of negation is one of 
contradiction, one should take the correct form of negation to be ‘It is not the case that…’.7 
This is because otherwise, the result would be one of contrariety instead of contradiction. 
Consider a sentence such as ‘Some unicorns are blue.’ If we were to negate this sentence 
using a narrower form of negation, we would get ‘Some unicorns aren’t blue.’ These two 
sentences are not contradictory, but contrary to each other (they can be true simultaneously). 
                                                            
3 Speranza and Horn 2010: 278 
4 Speranza and Horn 2010: 280-281 
5 Speranza and Horn 2010: 281-282 
6 Speranza and Horn 2010: 285 
7 Speranza and Horn 2010: 285  
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Furthermore, Strawson disagrees with the Modernist’s approach to definite 
descriptions.8 Modernists usually take that sentences such as ‘The present king of France is 
not bald’ are true if there is no present king of France. This is so because if the sentence is 
formalized in a Russelian fashion, it is a conjunction of three propositions (there is a king of 
France, there is only one, he is bald). If one of those conjuncts is false, the whole conjunction 
is by definition false, and the negation of the conjunction becomes true. Strawson claims that 
such a sentence is neither true nor false, but rather pointless because one can neither confirm 
the sentence to be true or false.9 
 On the other hand, Grice considers such instances where negating a proposition 
doesn’t necessarily mean claiming its contradiction. He calls this “substantive disagreement” 
and describes it as instances where one is not contradicting a statement, but rather trying not 
to assert what the statement has originally asserted in favor of a more precise assertion in the 
given context.10 For instance, let’s say a famous singer is on tour and someone claims that: 
I. In a given moment, that singer will be at city X or city Y. 
One can disagree with the statement if he is better acquainted with the possible tour dates and 
claim a different sentence such as: 
II. In a given moment, the singer will be at city X, city Y, or city Z. 
III. In a given moment, the singer will be at city X, city Y, or city Z. 
In such cases, the claim of (I) is not contradicted by claiming (II), but rather made more 
precise for the given context. Grice claims that such assertions are not meant to question the 
truth-functionality of ‘or’, but they do give way to a more precise inspection of the truth-
functionality of ‘not’.11 
 From this, it follows that not all which falls under the scope of negation is the result of 
the logical form. Negating sentence (I) can be seen as an instance of metalinguistic negation. 
There should, therefore, be some rules as to how to deal with similar aspects in negated 
sentences. This is where one usually resorts to pragmatics. 
                                                            
8 Speranza and Horn 2010: 285 
9 Speranza and Horn 2010: 285 
10 Speranza and Horn 2010: 294-295 
11 Speranza and Horn 2010: 295 
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 Grice proposes that these aspects can be covered by what he calls conversational 
implicatures. He claims that these implicatures deal with pragmatic inferences, and thus fall 
outside the domain of logic and semantics. Furthermore, he notes that implicatures do not 
impair the well-constructed system of Modernist logic, and that any pragmatic addition to this 
system only makes a trivial difference, which can in no way endanger the system as a 
whole.12  
 It is in this context that I will try to put my thoughts on the matter. Through this paper, 
I will try to see how rules of pragmatic inference interact with the semantics of negation, what 
the consequences are of proposing such rules, and if some rules should be replaced by more 
effective ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
12 Speranza and Horn 2010: 287 
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3. AMBIGUITIES OF NEGATION 
 
Let me start by considering the basics of negation. The following example describes, 
albeit more formally than one would usually try to explain it, how negation is understood by 
the majority, especially those who are not versed in classical (or any kind of formal) logic. 
The example is given by Johan Brandtler in his article named On Aristotle and Baldness: 
Topic, Reference, Presupposition of Existence, and Negation. He mentions that Aristotle 
thought that the relation the subject has with the predicate can be either one of affirmation or 
denial. This means that either the affirmation or the denial is true because they are 
contradictory terms; both affirmation and denial cannot be true at the same time. 13 He calls 
this the Law of Contradiction (LC): 
“(5) Socrates is ill.  
(6) Socrates is not ill. 
If sentence (5) is true, (6) cannot be true simultaneously.”14 
However intuitive this may seem at first, the more one ponders what problems could arise 
from negation, the more clear it becomes that natural-language negation deserves a more in-
depth treatment than just the LC. There are many philosophers who have tackled some of the 
problems which have sprung up from analyzing negation and what it means for the rest of the 
natural language it is a part of. Some of these problems were a starting point for my 
bachelor’s thesis, along with many a discussion I’ve had with my colleagues. In my 
bachelor’s thesis, I talked about three general problems often encountered when trying to 
analyze what ‘not’ means when incorporated in more complicated propositions; the scope 
ambiguity, the metarepresentational ambiguity, and the preserving or denying of 
presuppositions when talking about negation. I will try to explain these problems in short, but 
I will mainly concentrate on the third problem (presuppositions). I believe that by giving 
presuppositions in negation a closer look, we may find an underlying basis for not only the 
other two problems, but the understanding of negation in general. This is so because to 
understand presuppositions and how they behave in examples containing negations, one must 
first tackle the semantics and pragmatics of negation, which are the main aspects I will try to 
tackle in this paper.  
                                                            
13 Brandtler 2006: 179 
14 Brandtler 2006: 179 
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 To better understand the problematic scope when talking about negation, I shall revisit 
Robyn Carston's Thoughts and Utterances which provides an in-depth overview of many 
problems in natural language: 
It is well known that the sentence in (1a) may be understood in the two distinct ways 
given in (1b) and (1c): 
(1)  a. All the children haven’t passed the exam. 
b. Not all the children have passed the exam. 
c. None of the children have passed the exam. (Carston 2002: 266) 
As we can see, the difference in these interpretations consists in whether it is possible for at 
least some children having passed the exam as it is the case in (1b), or not, as it is the case in 
(1c).15 Carston also provides a standard formalization for the two interpretations: 
 (2)  -(∀x[Cx → Px]) 
 or:  -[every x: x child] (x passed the exam) 
(3)  ∀x [Cx → -Px] 
 or:  [every x: x child] - (x passed the exam) (Carston 2002: 266) 
Carston explains that the two interpretations differ on how ‘not’ is understood in each of 
them; in the first it has a wide scope which means that it operates over the whole sentence, 
while in the second interpretation it operates only over the verb phrase and, thus, has a narrow 
scope.16 
When I presented this article at a conference in Belgrade, an interesting discussion arose 
about the interpretation of (1a). This discussion mainly concerned the truth conditions in 
which (1a) would be considered true, and if those conditions are the only aspect relevant to 
differentiate between (1b) and (1c). From the formalization (and the natural language 
interpretation provided in (1b) and (1c)) one can conclude that the truth conditions for the two 
interpretations fairly obviously seem different; in (1b) there should be at least one child who 
did not pass the exam, while in (1c) this should stand for all the children who took the exam. 
But if we have a case that none of the children who took the exam actually passed it, one can 
also claim it is true that some of them did not pass it (provided the set of children is not an 
                                                            
15 Carston 2002: 266 
16 Carston 2002: 266 
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empty one – meaning at least some children did actually take the exam). This brings us to a 
possible conclusion that if we can claim with some certainty that when interpreting the 
sentence (1a) that it is true that ‘Not all the children have passed the exam’, then we should 
take this interpretation as the more secure one, and thus the correct one. But, as I will try to 
show later on with some more examples, this is not always the case. For now, let us consider 
what happens if we take that the truth conditions of the proposed interpretations actually are 
the same: 
I. We are trying to differentiate between (1b) and (1c). 
II. We are doing so on the basis of semantics. 
III. This incorporates considering the truth conditions of the sentence. 
IV. The truth conditions of the sentences (1b) and (1c) are the same, so we cannot 
differentiate between the two. 
My colleague believed that the (IV) could be discarded if we consider the following example: 
V. Keep in mind I also am a doctor. 
VI. Keep in mind I also am a doctor. 
This sentence, when differently accented (as indicated by the bolded text) can have different 
truth conditions. For sentence (V) to be true, at least two (or more) doctors have to exist. The 
reason for this is that the sentence is accented in such a way as to emphasize that the subject 
of the sentence is a doctor, same as another doctor probably mentioned in the context the 
sentence is given. However, for sentence (VI) to be true, only one doctor has to exist. This is 
because the subject in that sentence is probably listing his professions (hobbies, interests, etc.) 
and emphasizing that among the professions listed, he or she is also a doctor. While these two 
sentences look exactly the same when taking into consideration only the way they are written, 
they can be differentiated by truth conditions. This shows not only that truth conditions could 
help us differentiate between sentences like (1b) and (1c), but also that other aspects like 
highlighting or emphasizing should be taken into account when considering such sentences. In 
other words, the truth conditions could present a necessary but not a sufficient condition to 
differentiate between such sentences. The question now arises as to which other conditions we 
can (and should) consider while attempting to interpret negated sentences such as (1a).  
First of all, let us look back at the formalization of the sentence (1a) provided by 
Carston. We can see that by applying the negation to different parts of the sentence, we are 
11 
 
presented with two very different meanings. The question now is which of these meanings (or 
interpretations) is the correct one. These examples serve just to illustrate one of the possible 
obstacles when tackling negation – the scope distinction. Let us consider a further possible 
obstacle, again exemplified by Brandtler. He states that there is more to Aristotle’s example 
mentioned before. If we are to speak of a subject that doesn’t exist in the ‘real’ world, the 
sentence ‘Socrates is ill’ must be perceived as false, while the sentence ‘Socrates is not ill’ 
must be perceived as true. This seems to hold because one cannot say that something that 
doesn’t exist can have a property of being ill. On the other hand, it seems that if a thing 
doesn’t exist, it is true that it doesn’t have any properties (in this case ‘being ill’) so it is true 
that Socrates is not ill.17 
Again, to claim that a sentence such as ‘Socrates is ill.’ is true, we turn to its truth 
conditions. For this sentence to be true there must exist a man named Socrates, and this man 
should possess the characteristic of being ill. However, when trying to describe the truth 
conditions of the negated sentence, again we encounter two possibilities. One could say that 
for the negated sentence to be true, there must, again, exist a man named Socrates, but this 
man (as opposed to the previous interpretation) does not possess the characteristic of being 
sick. However, an altogether different interpretation may be given. If we say that it is not the 
case that there exists such a man that is named Socrates and that he possesses a characteristic 
of being sick, one could argue that the sufficient truth condition for this sentence is that there 
is no such man. This would make the sentence true even if there is no one to be characterized 
as sick. To illustrate this point further, Carston paraphrases a famous example by Bertrand 
Russell: 
(4)  The present king of France is not bald. 
This may be understood in two different ways, apparently depending, again, on the 
breadth of the scope of the ‘not’: 
(5) a.    The present king of France is non-bald (he has an excellent crop of curls). 
  b.   It’s not the case that the king of France is bald (since there is no king of   
France). 
In (5a) the ‘presupposition’ that there is a present king of France is preserved, while in 
(5b) it is cancelled. In logical notation these are, respectively: 
                                                            
17 Brandtler 2006: 179 
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(6)  a.    (ιx Kx) - Bx 
   or:  [the x: x king of France] - (x is bald) 
b.   -[(ιx Kx) Bx] 
   or:  -[the x: x king of France] (x is bald) (Carston 2002: 266-267) 
Carston claims that the first interpretation is much more neutral because it doesn’t require 
additional explanations which would provide the context for a better understanding, while this 
is not the case with the second interpretation. She believes that the second interpretation does 
not come across as easily as the first.18 
There are a lot of debates whether we can truthfully say that the ‘present king of 
France’ is bald if we know that it is not the case that such a person actually exists (since 
France is not a kingdom). If we follow a Russelian way of argumentation, there is no problem 
with sentences like these because when formalized, one could argue that this is just a three-
part conjunction (there is a king of France, every other king of France is the same person as 
the first one, that person is bald), and that one of the conjuncts is false, which makes the 
whole conjunction false, and thus its negation true by default. However, this doesn’t explain 
how two different interpretations of the given negation are possible. Both of these possibilities 
look logically acceptable, yet some may argue that it seems we have to opt for one or the 
other. In one of the interpretations the negation operates over just the predicate of the 
sentence, while in the other, the scope of the negation covers the whole sentence. As Carston 
puts it, the interpretation (a) seems much more ‘normal’ than (b), so naturally, we need to ask 
ourselves why it is so. This is just one of the ambiguities that prompt our contemplation on 
negation, the other two being what philosophers of language call the metalinguistic (mention) 
distinction, and the preserving or canceling of presuppositions. 
 Let us now turn to the metalinguistic distinction and see why some argue that it is 
relevant for the debate about negation. The following sentences, although same in form, can 
be interpreted in two different ways: 
I. a) I didn’t pay with pennies. I paid with dollars. 
b) I didn’t pay with pennies. I paid with pence. 
II. a) I wasn’t angry when you hit me. I was happy it didn’t hurt. 
b) I wasn’t angry when you hit me. I was furious. 
                                                            
18 Carston 2002: 266-267 
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We can see that the sentences in the follow-up greatly affect how we perceive the negation in 
the given cases. For the (a) sentences, it seems the predicate is taken to describe something in 
the world, and falsely so since it’s negated. Hence the follow-up sentences which also 
describe something in the world, only this time the (near) opposite of what the predicate in the 
original sentences is describing. However, if we understand the predicates in the (b) sentences 
as descriptive such as in the (a) sentences, they would contradict the predicates in their 
follow-ups. While I claim not to have paid with a certain currency in the sentence (Ib), in its 
follow-up it seems that I claim the exact opposite; having paid with that exact currency. In 
(IIb) I claim not to have possessed a certain property (being angry) under certain 
circumstances. On the other hand, in the follow-up sentence, I claim to have another property 
(being furious) which entails the property I claimed not to have. In the (b) sentences, there is 
obviously something non-descriptive being negated. In (Ib) we are negating the incorrect 
grammar of the predicate, while in (IIb) we are referring to the wrong degree of the property 
ascribed to the subject.19 
Even when we don't focus on the logical form of the given sentences, we find that the 
way we understand negation isn't without problems. Clearly, when considering the differences 
between the (a) and (b) sentences in this example, we can see that negation is not understood 
in the same way in every interpretation. This is because negation does not fulfill the same role 
in sentences (a) as it does in sentences (b). Usually, when correcting grammar or the level of 
quality (such as those given in sentences (b)), we do not resort to uttering full sentences, but 
only correct the word or phrase we disagree with. However, this doesn't mean negation can't 
be used in such a way to express this disagreement. When used in such a way, we do not place 
the focus of negation on the linguistic aspect of the word, or phrase used in the sentence, but 
rather the metalinguistic aspect; we focus on how the word or phrase is used in the sentence. 
Thus, when using negation in the metalinguistic context, we have to consider some further 
aspects other than just scope and primary meaning. Along with the scope distinction, for now, 
this gives us no less than four logical possibilities: 
Since we have here two two-way distinctions, there are, in principle at least, four ways 
in which a given negated sentence may be understood: 
 
                                                            
19 Carston 2002: 267-268 
14 
 
(a) narrow-scope descriptive 
(b) narrow-scope metarepresentational (mention) 
(c) wide-scope descriptive 
(d) wide-scope metarepresentational (mention) 
The following examples, all involving the sentence ‘All of the kids didn’t pass the 
exam’ (though sometimes with quite marked accentuation), with different sorts of 
follow-up clause, are intended to instantiate the four possible interpretations, (a)–(d), 
respectively: 
(9)  a.   All of the kids didn’t pass the exam. They will all have to resit it. (…) 
b.   All of the kids didn’t PASS the exam. They all got A GRADES. (…) 
c.   All of the kids didn’t pass the exam. Some of them failed quite badly. (…) 
d.   All of the KIDS didn’t pass the exam. All the CHILDREN passed the 
exam. (Carston 2002: 268) 
In sentence (9a) the whole set of children lacks the property of having passed the exam. In 
(9b) we can see that Carston used caps to show the accented syllables. Here the 
informativeness or relevance of the original predicate is brought into question. However, the 
entailment remains that the children have passed since they got A grades. In (9c) it is denied 
that the whole set of children has the property of having passed the exam because at least one 
of the children failed. Finally, in (9d) the use of the word ‘kids’ is brought into question as the 
inappropriate term, ‘children’ being the more appropriate one.20 
We can now consider again what this would mean for the argument I provided above 
regarding truth-values. In each of these examples, the truth values which we should take into 
account to tackle the sentence ‘All of the kids didn’t pass the exam.’ seem to be different. For 
(a), there should exist some number of kids who have taken the exam, but every child from 
this set would have to fail that exam. For the same sentence, it is sufficient that some children 
fail the exam if we opt for interpretation (c). This clearly illustrates the difference the scope of 
negation can have on the interpretation of a negated sentence. Additionally, when 
metalinguistic representation is taken into account, additional problems arise when trying to 
                                                            
20 Carston 2002: 268 
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consider truth-values. It seems that both for examples (b) and (d) there is a set of children who 
passed the exam, but the interpretation of the sentence (and its negation) is still different. As 
stated before, this is because the focus is not on what is said in the sentence, but rather how it 
is said; in example (b) one negates the sufficiency of saying just that the kids passed the 
exam, while in example (d) the appropriateness of the word ‘kids’ is negated. For each of 
these examples, however, we know that if one were to turn to truth-values for the 
interpretation of the given sentence, they would have to inquire whether the members of a set 
of children did have the quality of having passed the exam. But what if the set of children was 
empty? As Carston illustrates it in a further example: 
“e.   All of the KIDS didn’t pass the exam; there weren’t any KIDS taking 
      it; it was just for the mature students.”21  
Here, negation is used to correct the wrong assumption the set of children who have taken the 
exam was not empty; there indeed were some children at a certain time and place taking the 
exam. It seems that what is expressed by the sentence is closely related to the presupposition 
that some children exist who have taken the exam.22  
In this case, the sentence seems to be true because there are no children who can 
satisfy the condition of having passed the exam because not a single child had taken the exam. 
Again, when reverting to a Russelian way of reasoning, we may say that if the sentence is 
understood as a number of conjunctions and one of them is false (in this case that at least one 
child has taken the exam), then the negation of the sentence would automatically be true. 
However, in natural language, this is a peculiar use of negation. The problem here is that there 
is no referent to the subject (children) and still we use negation to operate over something in a 
seemingly normal fashion. Suppose that there is no explanation given in the second sentence 
for the same context. The question arises how someone would interpret this sentence with 
regards to the presupposition that some children sat the exam. Normally, one would 
presuppose that some number of kids did indeed take the exam, and only then would we be 
able to determine if the exam takers passed or not. 
 There is a continuing debate whether a presupposition is preserved or canceled when 
using negation in sentences such as these, or as illustrated above, sentences such as ‘The 
present king of France is not bald.’ Does a present king of France actually have to exist in 
                                                            
21 Carston 2002: 269 
22 Carston 2002: 269 
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order for us to determine whether the sentence is true or not, or do we even have the right to 
assert such a sentence?  
 I have tried to outline the three basic uncertainties which have prompted me to take a 
closer look at negation and how we use it. In the next section, I will go over some possible 
solutions which I have tried to provide for these problems directly. These “solutions” only 
represent my initial intuitions towards the three ambiguities I have mentioned, and later on, I 
will try to show how these intuitions led me to ponder negation and its basis much deeper and 
try to come to an overall solution and understanding which would encompass all of the 
ambiguities. 
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4. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
To tackle the problem of scope, we must first consider what each of the interpretations 
entails. It seems that the narrow-scope interpretation is the more natural one, and when faced 
with a negated sentence, it is the first one that comes to mind. This could mean that one first 
considers the conditions in which the sentence can be true or false, and after defining them, 
places the negation to operate over the predicate of the sentence. In the ‘king of France’ 
example, this would mean that one first takes that there exists a king of France, he is the only 
king of France, and he is bald. To negate the sentence, in this line of reasoning, it would 
suffice to say that there exists a king of France, he is the only king of France, and he is not 
bald. This, however, entails that the whole proposition (the non-negated sentence) is false as 
well, so one could argue, as Carston explains, that the narrow-scope interpretation actually 
entails the wide-scope interpretation: 
As is often pointed out, there is a relation of privative opposition between the two 
scope interpretations: 
(18)  a.   [Every x: x a child] - (x pass the exam) entails: 
       -[Every x: x a child] (x pass the exam) 
 b.   [The x: x king of France] - (x bald) entails: 
      -[The x: x king of France] (x bald)   (Carston 2002: 276) 
A similar explanation can be provided for the sentence ‘All of the kids didn’t pass the exam.’ 
If we know that there is at least one child who has taken the exam and failed, we can derive 
that it is not the case that all of the children who have taken the exam have passed it. 
My initial intuition on how to tackle the scope distinction was to turn to pragmatics. 
This view is shared by most philosophers trying to disambiguate the use of ‘not’ in natural 
language. But if the entailment from the narrow-scope interpretation to the wide-scope is 
taken as a sufficient form of disambiguation, it seems that no pragmatic task is needed to 
interpret these sentences. However, if one takes the narrow-scope interpretation as a starting 
point, they are still left with the burden of presupposition preserving. It is here we have to turn 
to pragmatics to try to explain if a presupposition should be preserved or canceled with 
regards to the scope distinction. One could argue that this means that the problem stems from 
multiple possible meanings of ‘not’ instead of just different interpretations of the same 
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meaning. I shall look into this kind of approach in the next chapter, but for now, I will focus 
on what I initially thought could be a way to avoid the problem of scope distinction. 
My first intuition was that ‘not’ does indeed have a univocal semantics that does not 
depend upon its scope, but the other way around. A good argument to support this claim is 
provided by Paul Grice and he calls it the Modified Occam’s Razor. Carston explains this 
argument as follows: 
(...) if we can give a pragmatic account of what is going on, that is, if we can derive 
the understandings of negative sentences by pragmatic inference from a single 
semantics, then that is preferable to positing two or more senses. (Carston 2002: 277) 
I strongly agree with this claim. If we take that negation is more than two-valued, there are 
countless logical consequences we have to give an explanation for as well. Some authors have 
tried to tackle this debate in such a way, but I believe that their theories leave much room for 
debate as I will try to show in an example later on. This is why I believe it is much more 
preferable to accept one sense of the word ‘not’ and start from there. Still, the question 
remains how one does come from a strong semantic starting point to a pragmatic 
disambiguation of the scope distinction. What I believed to be the best course of action is to 
consult the Relevance theory by Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber.  
They claim that there can be different degrees of relevance as opposed to something 
being either fully relevant or not relevant at all. Despite there being a lot of inputs which 
could make something relevant for a certain context, one cannot take all of them into account. 
According to their theory, the crucial aspect of an input being picked out from other similar 
inputs is that this input surpasses the degree of relevance from every other available input. 
They also define what they call the ‘processing effort’ for inputs we deem relevant. They 
believe that if the processing effort is greater, the input will be less relevant.23 
In other words, when we think about negation and its possible interpretations, we have 
to consider which interpretation is the most relevant to the context the negated sentence is in. 
As explained by Wilson and Sperber, relevance is a matter of degree. Thus, a narrow scope 
interpretation may be more relevant in some cases, while the wide-scope interpretation may 
be relevant in others. This doesn’t mean that if we pick one, the other is not relevant at all, but 
just less relevant than the one we picked. This way, one is prompted to make a final choice of 
                                                            
23 Wilson and Sperber 2004: 252 
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interpretation and, if this theory is to be believed, assume it is the correct one for the given 
context. If this is true for the scope distinction, I believe it could be extended to the 
metarepresentational distinction as well. According to the context at hand, we may opt for a 
metalinguistic interpretation of negation which is more relevant for that context. Intuitively, if 
the rest of the context calls for a metalinguistic interpretation in a way that it regards how or 
why the sentence is negated, it seems very odd to opt for a descriptive interpretation for just 
that sentence.  
However, these solutions aren’t without fault. As stated before, the narrow-scope 
interpretation seems to be the more intuitive one and, thus, requires less processing effort. 
This would mean that one should always take it as the more relevant one even though it is 
often less precise than the wide-scope interpretation. This leads me to believe that processing 
effort alone cannot be a measure of relevance, but the context in which the sentence is uttered 
has a much bigger role. For example, a logician may find the wide-scope interpretation much 
more relevant in certain contexts even though it is a less intuitive interpretation.  
As far as presuppositions are concerned, my first intuition was to turn to Carnap’s 
linguistic frameworks. He believed that in order to speak of a certain set of entities, one must 
create a new linguistic framework for this set of entities. For example, if one would wish to 
speak of the set of ‘things’ they would use the linguistic framework of ‘things’. Furthermore, 
he claimed there are two types of existential questions one can ask when a certain framework 
has been established: internal and external questions of existence. Internal questions are 
concerned with whether an entity exists in the framework, while external questions are 
concerned with whether the framework can exist as a whole.24 
At first, I didn’t take presuppositions to be more than an internal aspect of the 
linguistic framework used for everyday communication. As such, this framework can be said 
to have a high degree of success (otherwise we wouldn’t understand each other in most 
instances), so external questions can be ruled out. The question of presuppositions should, 
therefore, be an internal one. Carnap believed that if we accept something as real, we do 
nothing more than accept the rules of how whatever we are talking about behaves in its 
linguistic framework. In other words, when we talk about ‘things’ and accept them as real, we 
                                                            
24 Carnap 1956: 2 
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do nothing more than accepting the rules of giving true or false statements about those 
‘things’ and ways to test the truth of those statements.25 
When trying to incorporate Carnap’s view to the present debate on presuppositions, it 
seemed that we can indeed speak of kings, France, kids, exams, etc. without much trouble. 
Those terms would fall under the set of ‘things’ and we would have no problem incorporating 
them into everyday sentences such as ‘The present king of France is not bald.’ In other words, 
when talking about the present king of France, we would know exactly how to incorporate 
such an entity into our framework, and how to check if the statements about such an entity are 
true or false. 
 However, this leads to a different kind of ambiguity; the ambiguity of whether some 
existential questions are internal or external. We could ask a question such as “Do unicorns 
really exist?” If we take this to be an internal question, we are left with no answer because 
there are no clear rules of how we can check if the statements about unicorns are true or false. 
On the other hand, this cannot be an external question since we take that ‘unicorn’ is a term 
we can use in our linguistic framework with a relatively high rate of success from our 
interlocutors. Carnap believes that such questions can also regard our experience with the 
term and whether the use of such terms proves adequate, but this leads to a matter of 
subjective degree, and thus cannot be a definitive answer to the given question.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
25 Carnap 1956: 4 
26 Carnap 1956: 8 
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5. SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF ‘NOT’ 
 
 Robyn Carston provides an overview of different positions regarding the roles of the 
semantics and pragmatics in the understanding of the natural-language word ‘not’ and how it 
mirrors the logical operator of negation. For this purpose, she created a table to graphically 
show what the relation is between the semantic understanding of ‘not’ and its pragmatic 
disambiguation as viewed by different authors. In this chapter, I will try to provide an 
explanation for each of these positions, what the crucial points in which they differ are, and I 
will try to give a comment on whether or not I agree with what they entail. First, here is 
Carston’s summary: 
 
‘not’ 
 
 
semantic ambiguity    semantic univocality 
(pragmatic disambiguation) 
 
 
    semantics =    semantics = 
    wide scope;    scope-neutral; 
    narrow scope    both wide and 
    pragmatically    narrow scope 
    derived    pragmatically derived 
 
 
conversational   propositional 
implicature    narrowing/enrichment 
(Gricean)    (Relevance Theory) 
(Carston 2002: 290) 
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5.1. Semantic ambiguity + pragmatic disambiguation 
 The first position I will try to comment is one of semantic ambiguity. This regards 
those who believe something to be wrong with the classical, two-valued meaning of the word 
‘not’. This is usually heavily related to sentences for which presuppositions are not fulfilled, 
such as the case is with the ‘present king of France’ examples. According to Carston, these 
authors usually resort to three-valued logic, and say that these kinds of sentences are neither 
true nor false. It should be noted that these approaches also come with their own specific 
negation operators, multi-valued truth tables for those operators which often behave 
differently when the presuppositions are preserved or canceled.27 
 For this approach, I will concentrate on the position taken by Noel Burton-Roberts and 
its critique by Pieter Seuren. In his article Burton-Roberts on presupposition and negation, 
Seuren shows the basic tenants of Burton-Roberts’s program and explains that it starts with 
three key points: 
(1) Presuppositional semantics is not compatible with a semantically ambiguous negation 
operator because this makes the theory trivial and empirically meaningless. This 
follows from what he calls the standard logical definition on presupposition.  
(2) What follows from this, according to Burton-Roberts, is that one should differentiate 
between two negation operators: one presupposition canceling which should be 
viewed as a pragmatic phenomenon such as Horn’s metalinguistic negation, while the 
other is presupposition preserving and unambiguous. 
(3) Successfully analyzing metalinguistic negation is only possible through 
presuppositional semantics which defines it as ‘a presuppositional theory of truth-
value gaps’.28 
From the onset, we can see that Burton-Roberts incorporates two distinct types of negation 
into his framework. As I will try to show later on, this could complicate the interpretation of 
negation because what follows is a completely different logical system needed to 
appropriately map the truth values for the different negations. Burton-Roberts tries to clarify 
what he means by presuppositional semantics and he does so by explaining how it is based on 
what he calls the ‘logical definition of presuppositions’ with the following properties29: 
                                                            
27 Carston 2002: 272 
28 Seuren 1990: 425 
29 Seuren 1990: 426 
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(1) A PRESUPPOSES B iff A entails B and Not-A entails B. 
This, Burton-Roberts then asserts, has the consequences that: 
'(i) A and Not-A share their presuppositions, and (ii) where A presupposes B, 
presupposition-failure (in the form of the non-truth of B) results inevitably in 
A's having a third logical status other than true or false. Indeed, the definition 
in (i) is equivalent to that in (2) and to that in (3): 
(2) A presupposes B iff Not-A presupposes B. 
(3) A presupposes B iff B is true in every state of affairs in which A is true, 
and A has a third logical status (other than true or false) when B is not 
true.' (Seuren 1990: 426) 
As Seuren tries to show, these assumptions don’t seem to be justifiable from the point of 
propositional logic. He finds the biggest issue to be (2) because if the logic were two-valued, 
it would follow that B is a necessary truth since Not-B would lead to a contradiction by the 
rule of contraposition (A and Not-A). However, if one adds to (2) that B is not a necessary 
truth, we are left with a system which is non-classical; it has to have more than two values for 
negation.30 
 This is an interesting approach to the ambiguity of negation, but I don’t believe it is 
particularly successful to try to solve one ambiguity by trying to give a theory which entails 
even more ambiguities. Burton-Roberts has indeed tried to justify his theory by claiming that 
negation must not be ambiguous and it should be presupposition preserving. He does so by 
positing that the truth system is not three-valued as one would conclude, but rather two-valued 
with gaps instead of truth-values. Seuren claims that this is similar to the Strawsonian analysis 
of presuppositions and that Burton-Roberts takes this to be true even though there are plenty 
of other possible solutions and evidence for those solutions being more plausible.31 
 In my opinion, one should again consider Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor. If we can 
explain (albeit pragmatically) why classical, two-valued negation behaves in such a way that 
it sometimes preserves and sometimes cancels presuppositions, we should do so instead of 
trying to create a completely different system which is burdened with a lot of ambiguities on 
its own. 
                                                            
30 Seuren 1990: 426 
31 Seuren 1990: 432 
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 To show that negation is not always presupposition preserving we can use different 
‘tests’ of ambiguity. One such test is to consider sentences like: 
I. Brad has not stopped smoking, and neither has David. 
Intuitively, to understand this kind of predicates, we usually consider the presupposition that 
the subject is or has been smoking. To see whether the sentence is true, in this case, we should 
check whether Brad and David are still smoking. On the other hand, we could also check 
whether they have ever smoked. However, it would be odd to use such a sentence in an 
instance where Brad indeed hasn’t stopped smoking after years of being an addict, while 
David never smoked a cigarette in his life. It would indeed be true in both cases (which 
would, in turn, make the sentence itself true), but it would be ambiguous nonetheless. This 
shows that presuppositions still carry the burden of ambiguity which is not as intuitive as 
Burton-Roberts would like to believe. Since his negation is always presupposition-preserving, 
such sentences (at least with this kind of interpretation) wouldn’t be possible in his system. 
 There are many more examples of sentences in which ‘not’ is presupposition-
canceling such as the ‘king of France’ example mentioned above. If we take that ‘not’ has the 
potential to cancel presuppositions in all cases (even if these cases are marked and interpreted 
pragmatically) this does not bode well for Burton-Roberts’s theory. This would mean that 
Not-A doesn’t necessarily entail the presupposition which A would entail, which means that 
these presuppositions fall under the same category as the entailments Burton-Roberts bases 
his theory on; both can be explained under the rules of classical, bivalent logic. From this, it 
follows that Burton-Roberts has yet to reorganize his theory on presuppositions as a special 
category, different from entailments from certain sentences, and I believe that he wouldn’t 
need a non-classical logic to do so. This is similar to Seuren’s claim that presuppositions 
should be viewed more as suggestions rather than entailments when speaking about negated 
sentences. Since suggestions fall outside the domain of logic, he believes (and I agree) that we 
should not change the classical, two-valued logic because there is no reason to do so only 
based on presuppositions.32 
 Burton-Roberts does try to provide a pragmatic account that would serve as 
disambiguation for his ambiguous semantic starting point, but the focus here is on why such a 
semantics wouldn’t, in my opinion, be successful. 
                                                            
32 Seuren 1990:438 
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5.2. Semantic univocality + narrow scope derived from wide scope (Gricean approach) 
 Once we have established that the semantics of ‘not’ is indeed univocal (based on 
classical, two-valued logic), we can move forward with trying to explain away the ambiguities 
mentioned above in several different ways. 
 One of the approaches one can take at this moment is the Gricean approach as 
presented by Carston. In this view, the semantic interpretation of a negated sentence entails 
the existential presupposition by means of conversational implicature. This means that it is 
not interpreted as a predicate negation (narrow-scope) right away since that would make the 
presupposition an entailment by itself. This is further explained by Carston as she provides a 
function by Jay Atlas which illustrates how one pragmatically (using implicatures, as well as 
other given contexts) arrives at a narrow-scope or wide-scope interpretation.33 If we take R- to 
stand for wide-scope (negation of the whole sentence), R+ for narrow-scope (negation of the 
verb phrase), PRAG for the inference conducted in the Gricean spirit, and K for a given 
context, we can outline the Gricean approach with the following: 
PRAG (K*, R-) = R+ 
PRAG (K**, R-) = R-34 
If we take into consideration the example of the ‘king of France’ mentioned above, then we 
get the following result according to Carston: 
The Gricean analysis of the internal negation understanding that he assumes is as 
follows: 
(22)  what is said: -([ix: x king of France] (x bald)) 
what is conversationally implicated: [ix: x king of France] - (x bald)  
(Carston 2002: 278) 
She claims that in this case, the presupposition that there is a king of France is preserved by 
the conversational implicature rather than entailment. On the other hand, when only the 
semantics of the given sentence is taken into account, the presupposition is canceled.35 
 
                                                            
33 Carston 2002: 278 
34 Carston 2002: 278 
35 Carston 2002: 278 
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 Carston continues to explain several different takes on this account of presuppositions 
and how one derives the different scopes of negation in different interpretations, but all of 
these approaches share several key features: 
(a) The operator for negation is semantically univocal 
(b) The semantics for negation is wide-scope at the onset 
(c) The presuppositions are canceled when talking about semantics (the negated 
sentence by itself doesn’t entail anything) 
(d) The more intuitive narrow-scope interpretation can be reached by pragmatical 
inference, using the Gricean maxims. In doing so, presuppositions and other 
aspects of the sentence which are not under the scope of negation are resolved by 
conversational implicature.36 
I agree with the first feature, as I have tried to show in the previous section. However, I’m not 
sure if I would agree with the second assumption and what it entails. I will give my reasons 
for this later on, but for now, let us see if this account of negation can prevail over the 
previous one when tackling the proposed ambiguities. 
 Since this approach is based on classical, bivalent logic, it avoids the problems of 
introducing special new truth tables and truth conditions as the previous model did. This is in 
accordance with Grices Modified Occam’s Razor. The scope ambiguity is approached by 
analyzing the sentence as if having a wide-scope negation at the start, and later coming to a 
narrow-scope interpretation if needed for the given context. This kind of wide-scope 
interpretation also deals with presuppositions, specifically by canceling them. If an argument 
arises that the presuppositions are not really canceled, one can infer that they indeed remain 
preserved not by the semantics of the sentence, but rather by the conversational implicatures 
which are part of the pragmatical sphere of the utterance. The pragmatics would then also be 
able to account for the scope ambiguity and metarepresentational ambiguity (since the choice 
of interpreting negation as metarepresentational or descriptive would also fall under the given 
context). 
 If this all holds, then my previous intuitions about using pragmatics to tackle the 
proposed ambiguities would be correct. However, it may prove difficult to show exactly 
which of the Gricean maxims are relevant for which context or interpretation, and which 
                                                            
36 Carston 2002: 281 
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processes could be used to determine those maxims. I will try to explain this in more detail in 
the next section. It would be easier if these processes were more specifically defined or, better 
yet, subsumed under one process, which leads us to the next approach, fairly similar to this 
one, but different in respect to how one derives the narrow-scope from the wide-scope starting 
point. 
 
 
5.3. Semantic univocality + narrow scope derived from wide scope (Relevance theory) 
 This approach shares the first three assumptions with the previous one; the semantics 
is univocal, the starting interpretation is one of wide-scope negation, the presuppositions are 
canceled. However, when deriving the preferred narrow-scope interpretation, Deirdre Wilson 
and Dan Sperber resort to their Relevance theory.  
 They discuss negated sentences which are usually interpreted as having a narrow-
scope negation which preserves the presuppositions37 such as the following pair: 
I. Martha’s brother didn’t run the marathon 
II. Martha has a brother. 
They suppose that (i) is interpreted as a sentence with a wide-scope negation: 
III. ‘It is not the case that Martha has a brother who ran the marathon).  
However, this is entailed by the specific narrow-scope interpretation: 
IV. Martha has a brother who didn’t run the marathon. 
According to Carston, they claim that if one is to follow a properly construed maxim of 
informativeness, they would interpret (I) as (IV) rather than (III). The presupposition that 
‘Martha has a brother’ is neither the result of entailment or implicature from (I); they believe 
it to be a part of the speaker’s proposition, but semantic rules are not enough to determine it.38 
                                                            
37 Carston 2002: 288 
38 Carston 2002: 288 
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 Again, we turn to pragmatics for the disambiguation of the wide-scope interpretation. 
However, this account could avoid some problems one could encounter in the previous, 
Gricean approach. One could argue that some of Grice’s maxims can be vague when 
interpreting certain negated sentences. For example, as Speranza and Horn put it, the maxim 
of Quantity;  
“Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the 
exchange)”, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” 
(Speranza and Horn 2010: 286) 
When we wish to tackle the inference from the wide-scope to the narrow-scope such as in 
(IV), it is not clear how much informativeness is required. As Carston explains, there are two 
quantity maxims in Neo-Gricean accounts; the Q-principle (speakers should be fully 
informative) and the I-principle (speakers should not be unnecessarily informative). Both of 
these principles use different implicatures to interpret a given sentence, depending on which 
principle we are using.39 
 However, this is not a problem for the Relevance theory and its approach to negation 
because it only uses one principle; optimal relevance should be presupposed for every 
utterance. This follows from what Wilson and Sperber define as the processing effort; the 
speakers should not be as informative as possible, but only convey what their co-speakers 
cannot infer by themselves.40 
 As I have mentioned before, one of my first intuitions when pondering upon the scope 
distinction was to turn to the Relevance-theoretic approach. In my opinion, it is more precise 
than the Gricean approach (at least as defined by Carston). However, none of these two 
approaches explain why we take the wide-scope interpretation as a starting point even though 
the narrow-scope interpretation seems to be the more intuitive one, and one we come to using 
whatever pragmatic means possible. For this reason, we should turn to the following account, 
which posits that both the narrow-scope and wide-scope are interpretatively neutral. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
39 Carston 2002: 289 
40 Carston 2002: 289 
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5.4. Semantic univocality + scope neutrality 
 This approach is held by Jay Atlas and even though it is highly pragmatic (or as he 
dubs it, ‘radically radical pragmatics’), it differs from Grice and his followers in several key 
features: 
I. The semantics we take as a starting point is neither wide-scope or narrow-scope, 
but rather it is neutral between different interpretations. 
II. Pragmatic processes are what lead us to the expressed proposition; they are 
essential for the truth-conditions of the uttered sentence. 
III. Some of what was previously described as conversational implicature is now a part 
of the truth-conditional content. 
IV. Because of this, the use of pragmatics is crucial for the interpretation of the given 
sentence, not only for what it implicates. 
V. This means that we can no longer make a clear contrast between what is said and 
what is (conversationally) implicated.41 
This approach, like the ones described in the previous two sections, is based on the 
assumption that the semantics of ‘not’ is unambiguous and univocal. However, it does not 
assume that one should take the wide-scope interpretation as a starting point in interpreting a 
given sentence, but rather it treats both the wide-scope and narrow-scope interpretation to be 
on an equal level in the interpretation of a sentence. If it can explain how we interpret a 
negated sentence before taking into account the scope of negation, I believe this approach 
should be taken to be true instead of the two previous ones which were relying on the intuition 
that the narrow-scope interpretation is derived from the wide-scope. 
 It should be noted that this approach has a different formal outline than the Gricean 
one given above because different processes are involved. The main difference is that Atlas 
claims that pragmatics is used to understand both the wide-scope and narrow-scope 
interpretation, while the Gricean accounts posit that the wide-scope interpretation is part of 
the univocal semantics and only after it is taken to be true can we pragmatically infer the 
narrow-scope.42 
                                                            
41 Carston 2002: 284-285 
42 Carston 2002: 285 
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 If we take R- to stand for wide-scope negation, R+ for narrow-scope negation, Ki,j,k,… 
as different contexts, Nrep as semantic representation with an unspecified scope for negation, 
and PRAG for a function which takes the semantic input and provides an understanding 
through pragmatics, here is how Carston describes the difference between Atlas’s and the 
Gricean approach: 
I. The Gricean position:  
PRAG (Ki, R-) = R+  
PRAG (Kj, R-) = R-  
II. Atlas’s position: 
PRAG (Ki, Nrep) = R+ 
PRAG (Kj, Nrep) = R- 
(Carston 2002: 285) 
Atlas claims that this approach is preferable to the Gricean approach for several reasons. For 
one, both the wide-scope and the narrow-scope interpretations of the negated sentence have 
an equal phenomenological status. Since the Gricean approach treats these interpretations 
asymmetrically, there are cases in which by using the PRAG function one comes from the R- 
(the wide-scope) to the exact same proposition; the result of the function directly reflects the 
starting point (the wide-scope interpretation), whereas in Atlas’s case, the function performs 
the same process of interpretation in both cases and neither result is a direct reflection of the 
starting point. This phenomenological equality, as Atlas calls it, is the reason why one should 
prefer this account over the Gricean approach.43 
 An argument can be made that the phenomenological status of the two interpretations 
of negation is irrelevant for this discussion, as it borders with continental philosophy, but I 
don’t believe this is what Atlas meant by it. I am under the impression that this mainly 
concerns our intuitions about which of the interpretations is the preferred one in which 
context. Most philosophers believe that the narrow-scope interpretation is the more intuitive 
one which is why they set it as a sort of ‘goal’ which is achieved through pragmatic processes 
which start from the less intuitive, wide-scope interpretation. As Atlas puts it, for a competent 
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speaker, none of the two understandings is “less a function of the meaning of the sentence 
than the other.”44 In other words, any of the two meanings may come to mind when 
interpreting a given sentence with negation. 
 Carston seems to disagree with this assumption and claims that the narrow-scope 
interpretation indeed seems to be the more intuitive one. Furthermore, she believes that the 
asymmetry in the phenomenological level of the two interpretations is what keeps the debate 
on presuppositions alive, and what prompted it to begin in the first place.45 
 In the next section, I will try to show why I disagree with this argument, and how one 
can begin to approach the pragmatic system which is crucial in Atlas’s approach. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
44 Carston 2002: 286 
45 Carston 2002: 286 
32 
 
 
 
6. SCOPE NEUTRALITY REVISED 
 
 When we think about the two interpretations of negation, it does seem that we come 
across the narrow-scope interpretation much more often than the wide-scope. However, in my 
opinion, this doesn’t make it a more natural one. I’d like to make a comparison with some of 
the rules of logical inference here. When teaching logic, or more specifically modus tollendo 
tollens, my students found it very counter-intuitive that by negating the consequent one can 
negate the antecedent. I tried my best to explain it to them by tackling conditionals in different 
ways, but however I explained it, modus ponendo ponens always seemed to be the more 
intuitive of the two. This doesn’t mean, however, that one of these rules of inference should 
be preferred over the other. Both of them serve a different purpose in different arguments. I 
believe it is similar to the two interpretations of negation. As a logician, the wide-scope 
interpretation is as intuitive to me as it is the narrow-scope. In some cases, the wide-scope 
interpretation can even be more intuitive to me than the narrow-scope one. Let’s suppose that 
we have a sentence such as: 
I. Some unicorns are blue. 
If we are tasked to negate such a sentence, a more intuitive response (at least to me) would be 
to say: 
II. It’s not the case that some unicorns are blue. 
instead of 
III. Some unicorns aren’t blue. 
We can ascribe this to the fact that we don’t know anything about unicorns and how to check 
whether some of them are indeed blue, but this is not the point at the moment. These 
examples are just to show that, in language, if something seems intuitive or frequent, it is not 
always the best way to go. 
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 Since intuition and frequency don’t seem to be enough to determine the starting point 
in the interpretation of a negated sentence, I believe a wiser bet is to side with Atlas in regards 
to the (in)equality of the two interpretations. However, the question remains what input is 
pragmatically processed if not the wide-scope representation itself.  
 Natural language negation behaves first and foremost as a logical operator which it 
mirrors. Thus, as in logic, we should consider what it operates upon. Not only it makes certain 
parts of the sentence change their truth-value, but it seems that it also operates over some 
parts of the sentence which are not a written part of it; presuppositions being a prime example. 
If this is true, we can say that negation operates over some parts of the context as well as the 
given sentence (or parts of it) in that context. 
What we know is that some kind of semantic representation should be present if we 
want a univocal semantics of negation. What we don’t know is when and how this 
representation takes form. We have to find some sort of reference for ‘not’ which is rather 
difficult as we cannot interpret ‘not’ by itself; we can only do so in a certain context where it 
stands to negate a certain aspect of the context. 
Let us see what we are left with if we take that Atlas’s position is true, and that the 
wide-scope interpretation cannot be assumed as a starting point of understanding negation. 
We still have the rules of syntax; we know how to use negation (in theory, not yet for the 
specific case), and we have the context surrounding the sentence. Atlas also claims we have 
some kind of semantic representation, albeit scope neutral. While necessary for a univocal 
account of semantics, this semantic representation is what could prove to be the most 
problematic aspect of Atlas’s approach, since it is not clear what exactly falls under this 
category. I believe that here we should take a look at negation from a different perspective: 
one of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, in lack of better terms. Note that this is not the same as Frege’s 
account of sense and reference, but only my intuitions on negation which could perhaps be 
similar. In this view, I would call the semantic representation without scope a ‘sense’ of 
negation, while the final product (interpreted negation with wide or narrow scope) would be 
the specific ‘reference’. This ‘sense’ would incorporate our knowledge of how negation works 
theoretically and, combined with a given context, I believe we could come to a specific 
understanding using Atlas’s formula. 
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We also need to consider exactly what the role of the function PRAG is in this picture; 
which rules or pragmatic processes take us from this ‘sense’ to the final understanding in a 
given context. In my opinion, here is where, again, we need to turn to Relevance theory. 
However, this is where my intuitions start to differ from Atlas’s. 
 
 
6.1. Rigorous account of relevance 
We start by considering whether the semantics of the negation operator is indeed 
univocal. I believe that the monotony of classical logic and its rules of inference shows just 
that. The rules of natural deduction ensure that when using negation we will either interpret a 
proposition as true or false. This places us on the right side of Carston’s chart.  
Once we have taken the univocality of ‘not’ to be the starting point, the next step is to 
check whether a certain interpretation of negation supervenes over the other. It seems that we 
do not have enough evidence to claim that either the wide-scope or the narrow-scope could 
show prominence over the other. The only clue would be our intuitions about the preferability 
of the narrow-scope negation (meaning that we take the wide-scope as a starting point and try 
to achieve the narrow-scope interpretation), but I don’t believe this is enough for a serious 
epistemological claim. It is for this reason that I disagree with the accounts described above 
before Atlas’s. Only Atlas takes the epistemologically neutral stance and this is what I claim 
as well. He describes this as a phenomenological neutrality, but from Carston’s explanation, I 
believe that the epistemological aspect is what the focus should be on. 
This places us at the rightmost position on Carston’s chart, right where Atlas’s 
position is placed. However, this is where I would like to try and give my own account of how 
negation is understood. 
The first step we have to take to understand negation is to address the syntax of ‘not’. 
Having considered the syntax, we know that negation can be situated in specific positions of 
the proposition; wide-scope (if it operates over the whole proposition) or narrow-scope (if it 
operates over the predicate). 
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The second step is of epistemic nature. We try to establish whether we know exactly 
where in the proposition the negation is placed. Since we took that neither wide nor narrow-
scope interpretation has any supervenience over the other, we must conclude that we don’t 
know the exact placement right at the onset. 
In order to ultimately ensure the certainty of our placement of ‘not’, we must turn to 
relevance. Wilson and Sperber claim that relevance raises certain expectations and according 
to these expectations we are guided to the meaning of the proposition uttered by the speaker; 
they are indeed precise and predictable enough to make this inference.46 They also claim that 
the search for relevance in our interlocutors’ claims is one of the basic principles of human 
cognition and the reason why we understand each other, as opposed by the expectations of 
conforming to a kind of co-operative principle.47 In my opinion, this means that the search for 
relevance is directly related to rationality. If the interlocutor did not interpret the proposition 
as it was intended, we must conclude that either the interlocutor didn’t understand that 
proposition, or that he is irrational in this particular instance. It is important to note that one 
should understand the presupposition when it is not negated in order to make this step. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
46 Wilson and Sperber 2004: 249 
47 Wilson and Sperber 2004: 251 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
I have tried to elaborate upon the roles of semantics and pragmatics in the understanding of 
negated utterances. There are a number of ambiguities which could make a final theory of 
negation problematic, but I believe that the account I’ve proposed in the final section 
represents a good starting point in a further discussion on some of the ambiguities. I have tried 
to show what the position of this debate is in the historical context, and what motivated me to 
ponder upon certain problems of negation and how to solve them. My initial intuitions have 
led me to consider the basic aspects of negation, and I have tried to compare my position to 
some of the other prominent approaches to these problems. 
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